carriers.8 The FCC recently has proposed narr Title II by redefining the term "common carri currently regulated communication providers .9 Commission's effort to redefine the term "common carrier" and concludes that such action contradicts the expressed intent of Congress and creates confusion and uncertainty in the industry." The note in tially examines the FCC's effort to achieve deregulation through redefin tion,12 and reviews the historical development of the term "commo carrier"'13 in order to determine who Congress intended to regulate und Title II. Then, using guidelines established in recent Supreme Court d cisions, the note demonstrates that the FCC's attempt to deregulate redefinition exceeds its authority under Title 11.14 Finally, the note dis cusses the policy problems that the FCC's actions present.15
I. TITLE II REQUIREMENTS
The regulations set forth in Title II can be divided into roughly three categories: duties of common carriers, liabilities of common carriers, and economic regulations. The Communications Act imposes the duty on a common carrier16 to provide service "upon reasonable request"17 at rates that are "just and reasonable,"'18 "without unjust or unreasonable discrimination" or "unreasonable preference or advantage" t any party. 19 The liabilities of common carriers are set out in section 206 of the Communications Act,20 which provides a remedy for costs caused by delay in the delivery of a message,21 costs associated with discrimina-8. Id Economic regulations govern the business relations of com riers. For example, tariff regulations require common carriers t tariffs25 with the Commission and also to make them available f examination.26 The Commission must receive ninety days not changes may be made to the tariff schedule.27 Upon submi Commission may hold hearings to determine whether these n are unlawful and void.28 Common carriers must also file fo proval of new services, routes or transmission lines. 29 The national emphasis on deregulation has focused public on many of these economic regulations.30 Those who favor de posit that these regulations inhibit the development of a compet dustry by forcing carriers to disclose both tariff information an expand or develop new routes to other providers, who not on from advanced knowledge of competitors' plans, but can also the legality of the submissions in lengthy and costly proceeding also believe Title II's filing regulations impose high complianc common carriers, which are passed on to the taxpayer and sumer.32 Furthermore, they argue that the lack of flexibility in discourages new entrants to the industry and allows collusio (1986 The court's literal interpretation of the statutory language has suggested to at least one commentator that judicial consideration of permissive forbearance-and possibly even streamlined regulation-would yield the same result.50 Thus, although still in force, the deregulatory technique chosen by the FCC has been stalled short of what the Commission hoped to achieve.
In the meantime, the definitional approach to deregulation, which The interaction between the two remaining types of righ duced the concept of public interest in privately held busine the operator of a wharf or dock was free to profit from his pro interest, jus privatum,6' Lord Hale held that the jus priv "cloathed and superinduced with ajus publicum. "62 Lord Ha that the public right conflicted with and superseded the private ports inasmuch as:
1. They ought to be free and open for subjects and foreigner come and go with their merchandise .... 2. There ought to be no new tolls or charges imposed upon th without sufficient warrant, nor the old inhanced .... 3. They ought to be preserved from impediments and nusances may hinder or annoy the access or abode or recess of ships, and ve and seamen, or the unlading or relading of goods.63
Lord Hale explained and developed the concept of a privat affected by a public interest in his classic work, The Analysis He wrote that actions arising under a theory of implied contrac brought against " [p] ersons that undertake a Common Trust, " common hosts, common "farriers," and common carriers.65 T Hale's writings show two important aspects of a private busi serves a public interest: the infusion ofjus publicum into an private undertaking, and a duty to perform the service in a man complies with public expectations. 59 . For example, when explaining why seaports could not be erected without roya Lord Hale commented that "the safety of the kingdom, the commerce of the kin concerned in it. Merchants and seamen of all parts and quarters of the world are let i dom publicly, and under the publick protection in a publick port; and consequently it the extent of a jurisdiction palantine de novo to erect a publick port." Id. at 53. sumed that the entity in question actually carried something, commentators and courts struggled to incorporate telegraph a phone service within the concept of common carrier.74 The Supreme Court, for example, agonized over the characteristics of phy, and finally concluded that although telegraph providers sho be labelled common carriers, they were so analogous as to be he same standards.75 By contrast, the California Supreme Court h difficulty conceptualizing telegraph and telephone service as c carriers. In language elegantly reminiscent of Lord Hale, the c cluded that:
The rules of law which govern the liability of telegraph companies are not new. They are old rules applied to new circumstances. Such companies hold themselves out to the public as engaged in a particular branch of business, in which the interests of the public are deeply concerned. They propose to do a certain service for a given price. There The Mann-Elkins Act of 191082 resolved w telephones were classified as common carrier compromise bill completely reshaping regulation ating the first court that would review only agen gave the ICC regulatory control of telegraph a The bill as enacted not only gave the ICC contr it also decreed telegraph and telephone pr carriers.85 Unfortunately, the bill did not define "common carrier."86 The minimal floor debate concerning communications, however, helps to explain congressional intent. Representative Mann, who opposed extending regulation, argued that telegraph and telephone services were not common carriers because they did not involve the transportation of passengers or property.87 Representative Underwood disagreed and argued that "the telegraph line and the telephone line are becoming rapidly as Commission and mandated regulation of radio, was also incorporated into the Communications Act. However, the Radio Act did not address communication common carriers.
As previously mentioned, the Interstate Commerce Act did not provide a definition of a common carrier but instead merely described services that would be considered as common carriage.
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, ? 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. Competitive Carrier proceeding took issue with the emphasis in on "holding oneself out indiscriminately" to the public.101 The sion focused instead on the possible element of monopoly in tion. Relying on English common law, the Commission noted and other places "affected with public interest" had been commerce, and were scarce enough to be potential sources o income.'02 The Commission therefore proposed that a new should focus on the situation of the provider within the marke on the nature of the service itself.103
The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking continued the Commission's disagreement with NAR UC 104 and sharpened the economic theory set out in the first Notice.10o The Commission first observed that much commercial regulation is economic in nature;'06 second, that the regulations in Title II can be viewed as economic;107 and finally, that at the time the Communications Act was enacted, telegraph and telephone services essentially were monopolistic and thus ripe for statutory control. 08 The Commission deduced from these observations that Congress must have promulgated Title II as a means of checking monopolistic powers, and that entities subject to the regulations should therefore be defined in terms of market power.109 Thus, the FCC concluded that a common carrier under the Communications Act is an entity that is dominant in its market.110
The Commission's definition of common carrier is wrong for three reasons. First, the definition contrasts markedly with the definition developed and used through two centuries of common law. This definition looked solely at the nature of the service offered.'" Second, it contravenes Congress's mandate that common carrier be interpreted in an ordinary sense.'12 Third, the Commission's redefinition of common carrier is the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for action including a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.".. [The reviewing court] must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." ... Normal an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors wh Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence befo the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or t product of agency expertise.
Id. at 43. As Garland points out, such a review is quite substantive in nature. Garland, s Determining the "precise issue" is the threshhold inquiry in applying the first step of Chevron. Because the FCC wishes to redefine the term common carrier, the precise issue should be "how is a common carrier defined?"'33 The Commission, however, would rather phrase the precise issue as "whether certain companies offering communication services in markets where they lack dominance or market power should be defined as common carriers and become subject to Title II regulation."'34
The Commission could then argue that, because Congress did not address this exact point, the courts should defer to the Commission's construction of the statute.
The Commission's phraseology should be rejected for two reasons. 129. 468 U.S. 137 (1984 Even today there is an "ordinary," if not exclusive meaning of th term common carrier. The Supreme Court'46 and lower federal courts147 have continued to define "common carrier" by the nature of the service. No one, other than the Commission, focuses on the market dominance of individual providers.
The Commission may try to avoid the first step and proceed directly to the deferential second step by arguing that Congress did not expressly forbid defining common carrier by relative market power.148 This disingenuous reasoning ignores the tenet that it would be "absurd" to believe "that Congress delegated authority to vitiate . . its intent."149 This reasoning also ignores the rationale for deferring to agency created definitions: that Congress has implicitly delegated responsibility to the agency by leaving a "gap" in the legislation. On another level, the FCC's new approach to defining comm riers is confusing to those who are regulated. M predict. 161 An entity wishing either to enter a its position in an existing market may not be vance whether it will be subject to FCC regulati is added by fluctuations in market power tha common carrier only at certain times. Such u flaw in any regulatory system.
CONCLUSION
The FCC faces an everbroadening array of new communications services that fall within Congress's definition of common carrier. The FCC also faces pressure from an economic theory that suggests that the regulatory system applicable to common carriers will only inhibit these new services. Heeding the cry of deregulation, the FCC has proposed to achieve deregulation by redefining the term common carrier in terms of market dominance. Only those carriers that can dominate the market would be regulated as common carriers.
This note has demonstrated that the FCC's attempts should be rejected. When Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, it had a specific definition of common carrier in mind. That definition, relating to the nature of the service rather than the position of the provider in the market, was based on the ordinary meaning of the term as it had developed over three centuries. It is possible that a new definition would better serve an agency facing current economic and technological developments.162 However, if the policies of Congress have become outdated or obsolete, Congress, not the FCC, is responsible for replacing them.
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